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
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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 13, 1983



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Interdepartmental Group No. 30

TO: OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg  
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UNA - Amb. Harvey Feldman  
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SUBJECT: Meeting on Proposed Steps to Implement NSDD 75

In response to an NSC directive, Interdepartmental Group No. 30 will meet on June 16 at 11:00 am to consider steps to implement provisions of NSDD 75 on US-Soviet Relations. The meeting will be chaired by Assistant Secretary Burt and will be held in room 6226, Department of State. The attached paper will be the principal subject of discussion at the meeting.

  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Paper on steps to implement NSDD 75

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NSDD 75

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Implementation of NSDD 75  
Proposals in US-Soviet Bilateral Relations

The basic approach of the Reagan Administration to U.S.-Soviet relations is set forth in NSDD 75 signed by the President on January 17, 1983. The NSDD established three fundamental long-term objectives of U.S. policy toward the USSR:

- To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas.
- To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced.
- To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest.

The NSDD underscores the need to convey clearly to the Soviet Union that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the NSDD notes the importance, particularly in a Soviet succession period, of making clear to the Soviet Union that positive changes in its behavior would create the possibility of an improvement in East-West relations. Recognizing that this approach is not likely to lead to a dramatic near-term improvement in US-Soviet relations, NSDD 75 underscored the importance of cultivating public understanding and support of the Administration's long-term policy approach.

In order to implement this broad strategy, the Administration has publicly and privately stressed realistic assessment of Soviet objectives and behavior. We have also underscored the need to rebuild U.S. and Western military and economic strength, so that there can be no doubt of our capacity and resolve to compete effectively with the Soviet Union in each of the critical arenas identified in NSDD 75. As mandated by NSDD 75, we have also conducted an intensive and comprehensive diplomatic dialogue with the Soviet Union to determine whether

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possibilities may exist for cooperation to mutual advantage. This process is essential not only to probe the limits of Soviet flexibility on issues of concern to us, but also to make clear that it is the Soviet Union, not the U.S., which is responsible for the persistence of the current level of East-West tension.

In its discussion of priority near-term objectives for U.S. policy, NSDD 75 calls for "building and sustaining a major ideological/political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about evolutionary change of the Soviet system." Two steps which have been proposed to implement this directive are:

- To negotiate a new cultural agreement which would facilitate our efforts to penetrate the USSR with our ideology, while giving us a framework to control Soviet cultural, academic, and media activities in the United States.
- To move forward with the opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York and possibly additional cities in the two countries. This would enable us to establish the first permanent Western presence in the capital of the Ukraine, while increasing the Soviet presence in New York only marginally.

The attached papers address in detail the pros and cons of both proposals. The IG believes that both proposed initiatives are entirely consistent with the broad strategy approved by the President in NSDD 75 and would constitute prudent and effective steps to implement it. In both cases, concrete U.S. interests would be served by steps that would also convey our willingness to explore with the Soviets moves we could make to mutual advantage. Thus, while contributing to effective management of U.S.-Soviet relations, these steps would also be helpful in sustaining public, Congressional, and Allied support for our new, tougher approach to the USSR.

It is recognized that these steps would represent changes in the sanctions regime adopted by the previous Administration in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Given the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it is essential that changes in the sanctions regime be carefully considered and represent a clear net benefit for U.S. interests. As with the Administration's decisions on grain sales and the Long-Term Grains Agreement, the IG believes that the proposals under consideration meet these criteria. Neither would signal a shift

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in our policy on Afghanistan or a return to "business-as-usual" in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. To make this clear, however, our public and private statements must continue to stress:

--That our overall policy of opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has not changed and that other aspects of the post-Afghanistan sanctions regime remain in place;

--That we are merely reversing steps taken by the previous Administration which impede a dialogue which is essential in times of tension.

--That both initiatives are clearly in the U.S. interest and will put us in a position to manage our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union more effectively;

--That there will be no tempering of our public criticism of unacceptable Soviet behavior; and

--That the rebuilding of U.S. and Western strength will continue so that there will be no doubt of our capacity and resolve to maintain the East-West military balance and resist Soviet expansionism.

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NEGOTIATION OF A NEW CULTURAL AGREEMENT

INTRODUCTION

NSDD 75 sets as a basic task of U.S. policy the promotion of change in the USSR. It notes that, along with radio broadcasting, our most important means for ideological penetration and promotion of democratic values in the USSR are exchanges activities and the exhibits program. The NSDD states that we should reverse a pattern of dismantling those programs, and should instead expand those which can serve our objective of promoting change in the Soviet Union. It calls for an official framework for handling exchanges and obtaining reciprocity to prevent the Soviets from gaining unilateral advantage from their activities in the U.S. and their control of our access to the Soviet people.

We have not had such an official framework since the last cultural exchanges agreement was allowed to expire in December 1979 in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In consequence, the great fields of ideologically effective operations that the agreements opened to us in the USSR, such as exhibits (in which we had a clear advantage over the Soviets), are now closed. This leaves the Soviets in a position to work around us with private institutions and individuals to exploit the imbalance created by their closed system, given the openness of our society. We are left with no ready means to achieve a significant measure of reciprocity in cultural relations. Soviet propagandists have ready access to our media, and the Soviets are showing signs of changing their policy against sending performing artists here -- all without reciprocity being enforceable.

Diplomatically, the issue of a cultural agreement was included in the general review of bilateral relations conducted by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Dobrynin this year, and the Soviets have expressed willingness to renew negotiations. At lower level, they have hinted that they will no longer insist on USG guarantees against defection of Soviet performers, the issue which brought renegotiation of the previous agreement to a standstill even before December 1979.

The Department of State is at present seeking modification of the current visa law to improve our ability to enforce

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reciprocity through the visa process. Visa refusals are, however, a clumsy tool, poorly suited to dealing with highly visible cultural visits. A more positive and flexible instrument is needed to maximize our ability to use cultural exchanges to penetrate Soviet society. Ambassador Hartman, who has been filling the reciprocity gap somewhat through privately-funded cultural events at Spaso House, strongly supports negotiation of a new cultural agreement both to increase American Cultural penetration and to enforce reciprocity.

Options:

We see two basic options:

- 1) Negotiate a new exchanges agreement that ensures reciprocity, replacing the one that expired in 1979. It would provide a framework that focussed on the following areas:
  - Thematic exhibits -- in the past such exhibits in the USSR, manned by russian-speaking American guides, had an overwhelming ideological impact, which Soviet exhibits here could in no way match.
  - Radio and TV -- we would seek to obtain greatly improved access to Soviet nationwide electronics media, to offset the access Soviet propagandists have to ours.
  - Publications -- an agreement would restore an official basis for the continued distribution of America illustrated in the USSR and Soviet life; we would seek a higher level of distribution in the USSR.
  - Educational and academic exchanges -- these both provide access to Soviet elites and support the base of U.S. expertise on the USSR.
  - Performing arts -- restoration of exchanges in this area can expose Soviet audiences to the possibilities of free cultural development, in contrast to the stifling restrictions of their system, and reciprocal provisions would give us the means to prevent splashy Soviet media events here.
  - Films -- we would require reciprocity for the Soviet film weeks now being held here regularly on a commercial basis.
  - Access to Soviet elites -- we would have a basis to require reciprocity for the almost unlimited access Soviet officials, propagandists and academics have to our institutions.

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Pros:

- A new agreement on this basis would be responsive to NSDD 75.
- A properly drafted agreement would define the areas in which reciprocity must be provided, and the means of enforcing it.
- By putting continued access to U.S. audiences on a reciprocal basis it should improve our access to influential Soviet circles, present and future.
- Exhibits, access to Soviet media and all other legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society would be included in an agreement.
- Most of the Allies and a substantial element in Congress would support an agreement.

Cons:

- This would involve negotiating a highly visible agreement to replace the one we permitted to expire following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, without significant improvement of the situation there.
  - We would need to explain how it conforms to our sanctions policy and demonstrate that we are not returning to business-as-usual, by putting this step in the framework of our testing strategy while maintaining pressure on the Soviets concerning Afghanistan.
- 2) Continue current practice.

Pros:

- This involves no change, and is easy to administer; no negotiations with the Soviets would be required, and we would not have to explain apparent departures from our sanctions program.

Cons:

- We would forgo an opportunity to be responsive to NSDD 75; we would do nothing to ensure reciprocity or improve access to Soviet society through exchanges; the Soviets would continue to have easy access to American Society; and it would be harder to implement a strategy of testing the Andropov leadership's willingness to explore small steps of benefit to us as well as the Soviets.

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NEGOTIATIONS ON ESTABLISHING CONSULATES  
IN KIEV/NEW YORK AND POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE

INTRODUCTION

NSDD 75 provides that a central objective of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will be promoting internal pressure inside the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism, and specifically that we should seek to penetrate the Soviet Union with our ideology and exploit weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire. Our task, mandated by the decision document, is to work for change in the USSR toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. We now need to translate that mandate into specific moves geared to that general objective.

The issue of whether or not to renew negotiations with the Soviets to establish additional consulates in the USSR and the U.S. has been proposed for decision in precisely this context.

Briefly, the diplomatic history of the issue is as follows:

- In the 1974 Summit Communique the two countries agreed to "open additional Consulates General in two or three cities of each country," and, as a first step, to the simultaneous establishment of posts in Kiev and New York City. The Soviets had resisted for more than two years the location of a consulate in Kiev, offering a less advantageous site (Odessa), but finally yielded to the U.S. insistence on Kiev during the 1974 summit, apparently as a necessary concession to demonstrate an expanding relationship.
- By the time the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, advance parties were in place in the two cities and formal openings were anticipated within six months. The Carter Administration decided to put the process on hold, withdrew our advance party and ordered the Soviets to withdraw theirs as part of our sanctions program. Many believe that, like the grains embargo, this decision was a mistake from the beginning because it hurt us more than the Soviets. Since then, the property which had been acquired or prepared in the two countries has been maintained empty, at modest cost to both governments. The Soviets have periodically

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inquired as to our intentions, claiming they are "under pressure" from the Kiev City authorities to hand back the office building prepared for us. In April 1982 we responded officially that we would appreciate their holding the building question in abeyance, although we were not prepared for further discussion of the overall issue. Subsequently, the issue has been raised in the course of the general review of bilateral relations conducted by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Dobrynin, and the Soviets have indicated willingness to move forward on it.

Meanwhile, NSDD 75 was signed by the President in January as the basic document for U.S. Soviet policy; discussions in the nationalities working group have suggested that opening U.S. Consulates in Kiev and Tashkent should be considered as feasible means of increasing our contact with the USSR's largest non-russian nationalities; and some Jewish and Ukrainian community organizations and members of congress, including Senator Specter, have urged the opening of a Consulate in Kiev to provide improved official U.S. consular protection for American visitors to the Ukraine, and to demonstrate our concerns about the Soviet human rights situation in practical fashion. Ambassador Hartman supports moving forward on this issue for these reasons, and as part of our testing strategy.

The specific issues are:

- 1) Whether proposing negotiations leading to an increase in the U.S. official presence in the Soviet Union through opening new Consulates is an appropriate way to increase our penetration of Soviet society and to implement our strategy of testing the Andropov leadership at this time, given the drawbacks; and
- 2) If so, whether we should propose negotiations on opening two new sets of Consulates, i.e. at Tashkent and second American City in addition to Kiev and New York, in line with the 1974 agreement.

Options

They are essentially as follows:

- 1) Inform the Soviets that the U.S. is ready to renew the process of establishing Consulates General in Kiev and New York City (and possibly to begin negotiations to establish in two other cities, depending on how options 3 and 4 below are decided); propose a public announcement and the resumption of technical discussions toward this end.

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Pros:

- A U.S. official presence in the Ukraine (and Central Asia) would be closely controlled by the Soviets, and would operate with difficulty, but it would contribute to building internal pressure to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism and promoting change within the Soviet Union, in accordance with NSDD 75, by its activities in a sensitive region (or regions) of the USSR. It would provide a new base or bases for contacts with nationality, religious and dissident groups in a period when nationalism is arguably the strongest internal pressure on the Soviet regime, as well as for developing USG expertise in these areas.
- Establishment of new consulates in these areas would demonstrate our concerns over human rights and nationalities in the Soviet Union in tangible form. A consulate in Kiev would be welcomed by American Jewish and Ukrainian groups for the improved official protection it could provide to visitors under the U.S.-USSR consular convention, and for the simple encouragement of its presence.
- This proposal would be difficult for the Soviets to resist, given their stress on policy continuity under the Andropov leadership, since it refers to an agreement signed at Summit level.
- If successful, negotiations for establishment would remove the Soviet threat to turn over the office building they have prepared for us in Kiev to the local authorities, and thus the need to acquire a more expensive new building if we decide to establish there later.
- The proposal is an appropriate vehicle for testing the Soviets on a small issue where benefit would be mutual or, on balance, in our favor.

Cons:

- Moving forward in this area involves lifting an Afghanistan sanction at a time when Soviet behavior in Afghanistan has not improved. Although the sanction cost us more than it did the Soviets, some groups would have trouble understanding that moving forward and getting something for it does not mean the U.S. is returning to business-as-usual.
- Although the Soviets would add only marginally to their already substantial presence in New York while we would

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gain a new city in the USSR, the Soviet opening in New York would increase their intelligence presence there. This would somewhat increase the burden on our counter-intelligence capabilities. At the same time the Bureau's resources are being increased, and we are taking a number of steps to limit the Soviet threat.

- Depending on how fast we wish to establish in Kiev and how big an operation we wish to put in place there, the cost over a period of years could run from 500,000 to upwards of 2.5 million dollars in scarce funds.
- We should concentrate on really serious issues like the Soviet arms buildup or international expansionism.

2) Continue current practice.

In general, the pros and cons are the inverse of those for option 1:

Pros:

- We would not have to explain that lifting a sanction at this time does not signal return to business-as-usual; the burden on our counter-intelligence capabilities would not rise; we would not need additional funds; and we would not need to expend energy on a minor issue in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Cons:

- We would have forgone a major base to increase our penetration of Soviet society; we would be unable to provide the protection and encouragement some American Community spokesmen say visitors would appreciate, and to give this tangible demonstration of our concerns over Soviet human rights; and it would be more difficult to implement a testing strategy in conditions where we stand to benefit and can control.

If we decide to go ahead to propose negotiations on consulate openings to the Soviets, there are two further options:

3) Propose to the Soviets that in addition to moving forward on Kiev and New York, we negotiate to open Consulates in Tashkent and another American city as well.

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Pros:

- Over the next years and decades, nationalities tensions are likely to be even more severe in Soviet Central Asia than in the Ukraine, and a Consulate in Tashkent would be even more useful to us as [redacted] source of American influence than a mission in Kiev.
- If the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan continues, having people in Tashkent would put us "behind the lines" of a major theater of Soviet expansionism.
- Making this proposal would be a tougher test of Soviet willingness to move forward in bilateral relations because when Kiev and New York closed down nothing further had been done to implement the general commitment in the 1974 communique to open "in two or three cities."

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Cons:

- Opening in Tashkent would cost more scarce money.
- A Soviet opening in a fourth American city (after Washington, San Francisco and New York) would make our counter-intelligence task even harder.
- This proposal would be easier for the Soviets to turn down precisely because there was no practical follow-up to the 1974 "two-to-three cities" commitment.

4) Not to propose negotiations for Tashkent and an additional American city.

In general, the pros and cons are the inverse of those for option 3:

Pros:

- We would not spend more money; we would not increase the counter-intelligence burden; we would not face a Soviet turndown.

Cons:

- We would have lost a possible opportunity to establish a presence beyond the USSR's Afghanistan lines in Central Asia; we would have given up a potential vehicle for testing Soviet intentions in bilateral relations.

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